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Strong Impacts, Surprising Reactions
THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS places enormous challenges on the economic model that took shape in Brazil since the 1990s. The model had been tested by fi nancial crises in the past decade and by the exchange rate 
instability that accompanied the rise of the Lula candidacy in the fi rst half of 
2002. During the crises of the 1990s, however, the defenders of the model could 
allege that the economy still carried the problems caused by the inheritance of 
the previous model, and the crisis of 2002 could be attributed to the risk that 
the future PT government would alter economic policy. In this way, the current 
crisis directly questions the basic premises of the model, particularly the alleged 
advantage of foreign opening  in situations of international crisis. 
 The questioning is relevant exactly because one of the main arguments 
presented by its defenders to justify the break with the previous developmentalist 
model was the inability of the Brazilian economy to avoid exchange rate crises, 
and the internal turbulence they cause, at times of international instability. The 
crisis that began in 2007 questions if the country is effectively in better condition 
to confront the adversities of a strong international retraction and take advantage 
of the opportunities that every crisis raises. 
 As is known, the impact on the Brazilian economy was very strong, as 
the crisis worsened in the second semester of 2008. The rapid and accentuated 
drop in production and employment, the cut in foreign fi nancing and the 
retraction of domestic credit reduced investments and corporate production 
decisions. GNP should decline in 2009, or in the best hypothesis, any growth 
will be minimal. Nevertheless, there has been no currency crisis: despite the drop 
in exports, a surplus continues in the balance of trade and the capital entering 
the country led to a rise in value of the real in April and May. The impact on 
government fi nancing was small and there has been no disruption of the Brazilian 
fi nancial system. The government maintained a capacity to react suffi ciently to 
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adopt measures such as selective tax cuts, programs to support and stimulate 
the economy and even reduced interest rates. To accomplish this, the Lula 
government sought to broaden the range of support that it enjoyed, from the 
right wing of the political spectrum and business leaders to union centers, and 
there have been no signifi cant protests.
 These are signs of strength far greater than were expected, in light of 
the international crisis considered to be one of the broadest and most intense 
since the depression of the 1930s. The unprecedented nature of the reaction of 
the Brazilian economy is even more evident when compared with what occurred 
in Brazil and nearly all of Latin America at the beginning of the 1980s, when 
the eclosion of the foreign debt crisis gave way to ten years of strong economic 
instability. It is important to highlight that these observations were written in the 
middle of May 2009, and there is no assurance that the situation will not change, 
because of changes in the international crisis. 
 The hypothesis adopted here is that much of the Brazilian economy’s 
capacity to react is due to a combination of two types of factors. On the external 
front, the country benefi ts both from the way that the global crisis is being 
confronted by the U.S. government, which enacted a strong rise in the money 
supply to sustain the fi nancial system, as well as by the maintenance of growth 
in China. These factors can reach a limit or become much weaker, particularly 
because this world crisis has appeared in quite original forms, as do all processes 
of this scope. On the domestic front, the Brazilian economy has benefi tted from 
the ability of the government to execute anti-cyclic policies such as reducing taxes 
and its budget surplus, while also lowering interest rates.   There has thus been an 
unprecedented combination of the consequences of the crisis and some essential 
traces of the opening and liberalization consolidated in recent years in Brazil. 
 This essay is an effort to contribute to the analysis of the effects of the 
crisis on Brazil, and highlights issues less tied to the current situation than those 
that are related to changes that have taken place in the Brazilian economy since 
the change of orientation of the economic policy in the previous decade. The 
purpose is to improve understanding of the ability of this model to react to 
external instability and the possibilities that the crisis can be overcome even with 
the strengthening of the model’s presumptions and objectives.
 The article is organized in three sections in addition to this introduction. 
The second section presents a framework of the principal issues to be analyzed 
about the international crisis, in order to better locate its possible effects on 
Brazil. The third section discusses the relations between the liberalization model 
and the economy’s response to the crisis. The fourth and last provides some notes 
for refl ection on all these issues.
Controversies about the Nature and Development of the Crisis 
 Within the broad range of issues raised by the crisis, four questions about 
its nature and possible consequences can be presented: (i) is the crisis “only” 
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fi nancial or does it also affect the arrangement of the international production 
system that has been confi gured in recent years; (ii) will the singular position of 
the United States be affected; (iii) will China be able to “take off” from its strong 
burst of growth generated by exports to the United States; (iv) will the U.S. 
government’s intervention strategy be successful in preventing the failure of the 
banking system and in stimulating demand, by means of increasing the money 
supply and government debt. It is worth emphasizing that these four controversies 
are related and establish a framework of references that can be used to analyze the 
current outlook for the peripheral countries. The number of unknown variables 
and the high degree of uncertainty obviously hamper the establishment of precise 
prognoses, but offer a number of issues to be watched.
 The fi rst question is if the crisis is limited “only” to the fi nancial sector 
or if it is also a crisis of the entire productive arrangement that stimulated the 
global economy in recent years. With all of the provisos that must be made about 
making analytic distinctions between the fi nancial and productive “sectors,” 
the question is very important for the evaluation of the crisis’ impacts on the 
peripheral countries. 
 For those who emphasize the predominantly fi nancial character of the 
crisis, the unchecked expansion of unregulated fi nance (credit, derivatives, 
etc), created a bubble that distorted markets and then burst, causing an abrupt 
contraction. In this line, after the defl ation of the bubbles concluded and the 
cleansing of the fi nancial circuits (with the failure and restructuring of the banks) 
the real economy would return to growth, in a more orderly and healthy manner. 
 The argument is presented in an intentionally simplifi ed manner, and 
certainly deserves a number of qualifi cations, but allows emphasizing the 
questions to be raised. It is evident that the crisis resulted from the reversal of 
an expansion of unsustainable credit, but this expansion accompanied, triggered 
or made viable (the three terms are possible and each implies a particular 
interpretation) the strong growth of the world economy in these years, and at the 
center of this growth was the large U.S. defi cit.
 This defi cit led various economists to classify the United States as a 
“consumer of last resort” during this long expansion period. The designation 
is very suggestive. The function of borrower of last resort is attributed to the 
central banks, for their capacity (and attribution) of creating money “from 
nothing” in situations of crisis, as they have done intensely until now. To use 
the expression in relation to consumption is obviously an impropriety, but is 
an attempt to consider the surprising capacity of the U.S. economy to generate 
giant commercial defi cits and fi nance these defi cits by the creation of means of 
payment and of credit in dollars. 
 By maintaining its defi cits and paying for them, the United States, in 
addition to attracting exports from around the world, generated the dollars that 
returned to its markets in the form of investments in U.S. Treasury Bonds and 
other instruments with low return, the highly secure and low risk bonds in which 
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the exporting countries of the periphery accumulated their large foreign reserves. 
The system operated as if the United States could chose the size of its debt, since 
it automatically created the dollars with which the exporters fi nanced their own 
balance of trade. 
 The crisis questions the maintenance of this arrangement and thus the 
possibility that the peripheral economies can return to growth based on exports 
and high trade surpluses. As long as the recession continues in the United 
States, the arrangement loses strength, with a variety of effects on the peripheral 
countries – the most aggressive exporters suffer in the fi rst place, but the shock 
wave also hits those that grow by exporting primary products to East Asia and 
the United States. In this sense it can be said that the crisis is also that of a certain 
arrangement of the global productive structure, anchored or strongly dependent 
on a position of the economic leader that may prove to be unsustainable. 
 With the deepest phase of the crisis over, it is not clear if it will be possible 
to return to the previous arrangement. The forced adaptation to the drop in 
demand for imports and the U.S. commercial defi cits may be very diffi cult for 
various countries, which suffered from disruptions or disarticulations of links of 
the production chain - the recovery from which is uncertain - or because of social 
and political tension. These risks increase if the cooling of the U.S. economy is 
prolonged. The problems will obviously be much greater, and of a more complex 
nature, if the United States loses the capacity to maintain its position as issuer 
of global currency and the ability to fi nance its foreign debt by issuing its own 
money and its own securities.
 This is the second question about the crisis that must be analyzed. Until 
the beginning of 2009, there were no signs of questioning of the international 
role of the dollar. The intense issue of currency by the Federal Reserve System 
(FED), the U.S. central bank, and the expressive increase in the total government 
debt and its fi scal debt did not reduce the preference of detainers of wealth from 
around the world for the dollar and U.S. Treasury bonds. To the contrary, the 
reduction of interest rates in the United States was facilitated by the enormous 
demand for short term Treasury bonds and was accompanied by a rise of the risk 
premium on interbank interest rates in global markets. 
 The continuity of this role of the dollar as the global currency 
maintained the United States’ room for maneuver in managing the crisis and 
reduced the risk of unimaginable disorder in the global economy, in the case 
of a chaotic fl ight of wealth in search of protection outside the dollar or U.S. 
Treasury bonds. This scenario is in fact unimaginable, because there are no 
real assets, fi nancial or monetary, capable of supporting a massive run from the 
dollar. The occurrence of a progressive run, with the transfer of reserves of some 
countries to the Euro, for example, could trigger unpredictable reactions from 
the United States and Europe. 
 The controversy around this question is linked in various ways to the 
previous question. The reaffi rmation of the role of the dollar as the global 
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currency in the early 1980s, with the interest rate shock enacted by then U.S. 
Central Bank President Paul Volcker, established the current confi guration of the 
international monetary system. The designation of the system as one based on a 
fl exible dollar is appropriate, because it emphasizes its unique quality:  the absence 
of a metallic guarantee for the global currency and of any fi xed reference for its 
value, in terms of gold or any other currency. In other words, the system can be 
characterized by the absence of any commitment of the issuer of global currency 
to convert it into anything or to defend its price in relation to other currencies or 
any other reference. 
 By previous standards, this system should have made diffi cult the 
international fl ows of capital and trade, because of the absence of reliable reference 
values, as in the 1930s, when the central countries relinquished coordination 
of currency exchange rates. This time the reverse took place, with a prolonged 
expansion of trade and of fi nancial internationalization since the 1990s. At 
the base of this surprising result, was certainly the fi nancial sophistication of 
the markets in derivatives, insurance and other forms of risk transfer, all now 
questioned by the crisis that is linked to the atrophy of these markets. It is 
not inappropriate to question if there would have been growth in trade and 
production without fi xed exchange of the principal currencies if these fi nancial 
markets for the transfer and coverage of risks did not exist. 
 The third controversial question involves the sustentation of high growth 
rates in China. Without highlighting the numerous and complex questions 
linked to China’s accelerated economic development model, it is evident that 
the prolonged reduction of the U.S. foreign defi cit would remove one of the 
bases on which the model has been based until now. Can China maintain rapid 
growth based on investments in its own market, in its already large and diversifi ed 
productive base? If the answer is yes, the recovery of commodity prices and those 
of various industrial goods and services imported by China would be faster,  with 
a possible increase of tensions with the United States, even over the accumulation 
of its reserves in U.S. securities. This scenario also supposes a continuity of 
improvements in China, including more diversifi ed demand of manufactured 
goods and services as well as growing competition in various industrial segments 
in which the Chinese were importers until recently.
 The fourth controversial question involves the effectiveness and 
consequences of the decision of the United States and other governments to 
confront the crisis by means of heavy fi nancial assistance programs to banks 
and the fi nancial system in general. Money has been issued in unprecedented 
quantities and forecasts for growth of the public debt are also very high. A similar 
process has been taking place in other countries, such as the United Kingdom. 
 The governments of these countries appear convinced that the basic 
formula for managing the crisis is to expand government spending and issue 
money as much as seems necessary. It is as if they were seeking to avoid the 
errors of the Hoover Government in the early 1930s, which had aggravated the 
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depression by refusing to issue money and to use fi scal policy to sustain demand. 
Even if it is accepted that this was the principal cause of the deepening of the 
depression, it should not be forgotten that the effectiveness of the Roosevelt 
Government’s policies was only relative, because the U.S. economy only recovered 
with the war, while the German economy escaped the crisis much more quickly, 
but based on rearmament. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the 
“Keynesian” programs of the 1930s were applied in economies with low levels 
of public debt and with a much lower tax burden than today, a factor that has 
received very little attention.
 These two characteristics suggest that the U.S. intervention policy 
can be compared not only with that of the Roosevelt years but also with 
those of Japan in the 1990s. As is known, the serious Japanese banking crisis 
generated by the bursting of bubbles in stock and real estate markets at the 
end of the previous decade was confronted with policies similar to those now 
adopted in the United States. Nevertheless, the Japanese economy remained 
practically stagnant for more than 10 years. One of the causes of the paralysis 
was the weight of the “zombi banks,” which were kept standing and capable of 
generating profi t with the help of public support, but which remained incapable 
of unleashing credit and leveraging growth. Another problem was the concerns 
caused by the high public debt, including doubts about the ability to honor 
future pensions, which substantially depressed the willingness to spend by a 
large portion of the population. In sum, for years, the Japanese government 
tried to revive the economy with policies to stimulate demand, elevate liquidity 
and  maintain interest rates close to zero. But the strongest result was the 
growth of the public debt with no return to spending and investing in the 
private sector.
 It can be argued that the large increase in the money supply and the very 
low interest rates in the United States can lead to very different effects, because 
of the characteristics of the country, including its fi nancial system, and because 
of its condition as issuer of the global currency. The abundance of dollars may 
lead to a search for profi table investments throughout the world, which would 
encourage the recovery of commodity markets and investment in various markets. 
In addition to risking the creation of new bubbles, the global economy could 
experience a new wave of international liquidity without the recovery of the public 
sector in the central countries. 
The possibility of a return of infl ationary pressures should also be 
considered in this situation of slow growth in the central economies, pushed 
by commodities and by high liquidity, but also by a possible lack of confi dence 
in the high government debt in the central countries. Although it is a still 
distant possibility, it is worth noting that in this case, moderate infl ation would 
be a suitable solution for reducing the debts – or that is, infl ation would be an 
alternative for the economic policy of the countries affected by the “Japanese 
disease.” 1
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Liberalization Brazilian Style: the 1990s Model
 To examine the issues discussed in this essay, the model of opening and 
fl exibilization should be questioned from its capacity to confront foreign crises 
in two principal areas: (i) the adjustment of foreign accounts in light of reduced 
demand for goods and services and of the supply of credit and direct investment 
in global markets; (ii) the preservation of domestic fi nancial stability and of the 
fi scal capacity of the public sector to act in a counter-cyclic manner. At least until 
the middle of the fi rst semester of 2009, in both instances the model displayed a 
high capacity to respond to the crisis without compromising its objectives and its 
essential characteristics.
 Before examining the two questions, it is worth highlighting that the 
period from 2006 until the fi rst semester of 2008 was the time of the best 
performance of the model in terms of economic growth, after having been 
characterized by low growth in its fi rst 15 years. The few moments of strong 
expansion were soon reversed by external crises or by domestic problems. Even 
with the prolonged foreign  calm beginning in 2002-2003, the model delayed in 
reacting and only began to show robust growth after 2006. The virtual economic 
stagnation of 1990-2005 aggravated various problems raised by the model (very 
high interest rates, growing taxes, high public debt resistant to any reduction, 
deterioration of salaried income) or inherited from the past, such as poor living 
conditions for much of the population, problems in the productive structure 
and the concentration of income and wealth. Struck by the foreign turbulence 
at its best moment, the model of opening and fl exibility should now show if it is 
capable of confronting the foreign adversities better than the developmentalist 
model that it sought to dismantle.
 The formation of the model of opening and fl exibilization began with 
various measures adopted during the Sarney Government, but it was the so-called 
New Brazil Plan, announced at the beginning of the Presidency of Fernando 
Collor de Mello in March 1990, which effectively broke the pillars of the old 
developmentalist model. In a single blow, the government announced a unilateral 
and drastic commercial opening, a broad privatization program, reduction of the 
scope of action of the public sector and reorientation of its role in the economy 
and liberalization of price formation. These orientations were maintained in 
the following years and complemented by the fi nancial opening, by the effort 
to attract foreign capital and by various measures to resolve fi scal and fi nancial 
problems inherited from the past. 
 We understand a model to be a set of strategic economic policy guidelines 
that are maintained in a more or less coherent manner for a long period of time, 
which are strong enough to condition the choices of the various successive 
governments. The concept supposes that a model has the capacity to support 
changes in the economic conjuncture with alterations in basic economic policy 
(currency exchange rate, interest, spending and taxes) without having these 
changes compromise the set of orientations that defi ne the model. In this sense, 
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the late 1980s and the early 1990s marked the passage of the Brazilian economy 
to a distinct economic model. Since the fi rst decades of the 20th century, 
Brazilian economic policy was guided by the objectives maintained by nearly 
all governments in the period – industrialization, autonomy of the productive 
structure and development. These objectives disappeared with the Collor 
Government and were substituted by other basic concepts. 
 Despite the weak performance in terms of growth and generation of 
well-being, the model demonstrated surprising strength and was able to achieve 
adhesion from Lula and PT in the second half of 2002, although they had 
been strong critics of the model since its initial phase. The visualization of a 
strong probability of victory in the presidential elections of 2002 led the current 
president to abruptly change position, with the famous “Letter to Brazilians.” 
The adhesion was quick and practically a consensus within PT, without any 
demand for deep explanations from inside or outside the party. Since then, the 
model has found reduced opposition, with generalized acceptance of its essential 
presumptions and components. 
Concerning the country’s international insertion, the strategy for 
opening and attraction of direct foreign investment was defended with two basic 
arguments: the stimulus to technological development and the adjustment of the 
balance of trade in light of international market fl uctuations that had always led 
the country to diffi cult currency situations. 
 The defenders of the new model maintained that the developmentalist 
policies implied a permanent closing of the economy, which impeded development 
by driving away competitive productive structures and technological impulses 
generated in the central countries. With the opening in the 1990s, the 
internationalization of the productive structure and the substantial entrance of 
direct foreign investment should have generated a more competitive productive 
base better integrated to the central dynamics. 
 The arguments were presented with great clarity by Gustavo Franco, one 
of the main formulators of the Real Plan and an important fi gure in President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s fi rst term. In a polemic text that was broadly 
discussed at the time of its publication, Franco (1998, p.127) maintained that 
industrialization by import substitution necessarily generated a stagnation in 
productivity and that the greater presence of transnational companies would 
increase productivity and export capacity. 
 Despite the success achieved in breaking the high infl ation in 1994, 
soon after the introduction of the new currency, the real, the new model had 
frustrating results in terms of economic growth and an ability to promote foreign 
adjustment. The economy grew little during Cardoso’s two terms  (from 1995 - 
2002) and the country had a series of problems hampered by successive external 
crises during the period.  
 Only in 2003 did the model begin to perform as its defenders expected. 
Now in the Lula government, foreign trade grew vigorously and the risks of 
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exchange crises continued to decline, with an accumulation of reserves and a 
rise in value of the real. There was fi nally proof that the model could generate 
the promised results. This conclusion is questioned, however, by the fact that 
world trade grew strongly at the same time, with the exacerbation of U.S. defi cits 
and the accelerated growth in China. It could be maintained that Brazil only 
accompanied the vigorous global expansion,  particularly because Brazilian 
participation in the total fl ow of goods did not grow signifi cantly.
 Other diffi culties in the analysis arose with the rise and diversifi cation 
of Chinese imports, with the strong pressure on commodities markets and the 
diversifi cation of the range of imports and exports of manufactured goods.  The 
vigorous growth of Brazilian exports can be attributed largely to the effects of 
China on primary products that we export and of other countries that export 
primary products to which Brazil sells industrialized products, such as many of 
our trade partners in Latin America.
 The result was not in keeping with the forecast that had been made by 
defenders of the new model. It is diffi cult to maintain that the expansion of 
the presence of multinational companies in various industrial segments was 
the most important factor for Brazil’s rise in exports. In a number of these 
segments, exports grew, but were accompanied by strong growth in imports, 
and the balance of trade surplus was generated mostly by primary goods 
in which Brazil has signifi cant natural advantages and in which Brazilian 
producers dominate. 
 This performance gave way to questions about a trend towards renewed 
emphasis on primary goods in Brazil’s foreign trade. Was there a relative decline 
occurring in the sale of products with higher technology content, or a shift from 
these products to less dynamic markets, in exchange for an increased weight of 
primary and semi-processed goods to the central markets?  The growing weight 
of products with higher technology content in Chinese imports points in the 
same direction. The debate is inconclusive, in part because of the diffi culties in 
measuring technology content, because of the diversifi cation of intra-sectoral 
imports and those within companies. Nevertheless, it seems certain that it cannot 
be affi rmed that the greater presence of multinational companies in the industrial 
structure has induced the benefi cial effects that their defenders maintained about 
the increased quality of exports.2
 Where the defenders of the model appear to have been right is in the 
greater resistance of the balance of trade to fl uctuations in foreign demand. 
The consequences of the global crisis in the fi rst months of 2009 reveal that 
the drop in exports was compensated for by even greater reduction in imports. 
Nevertheless, the drop in exports would have been greater if not for the strong 
sales of primary goods, once again because of sustained Chinese demand. It is as 
if Brazil had returned to the past, when the sales of products intense in natural 
resources sustained imports and guaranteed the solvency of the foreign sector, as 
long as there is demand to absorb them.
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 Does the model have its merits? This is an instigating question. It can 
be said that the model had the merit of adapting Brazil to the prolonged change 
in the relative price of its exports, provoked by the rise of China, although 
its defenders do not make this argument when defending the opening. The 
argument appears more linked to the old polemic about the country’s vocation 
for exports of primary goods, an issue that is surprisingly current in Latin 
America’s present situation. We need simply note that among the countries with 
medium and large economies, the one hit hardest by the crisis is Mexico, exactly 
that which has the largest participation of manufactured goods  in its exports. 
The greater dependency of exports on primary products reinstates the problem of 
incorporation and diffusion of technical progress, in addition to the generation 
of employment, issues that the defenders of the model sustain would be resolved 
by the greater presence of multinationals and by the greater participation in 
international trade fl ows. 
 In addition, the resistance of the Brazilian economy to the crisis in the 
fi rst months of 2009 is closely linked to the strong entrance of foreign capital, 
with a trend towards appreciation of the exchange rate and recovery of the stock 
exchange and demand for Brazilian securities. The government and defenders of 
the model maintain that Brazil is well positioned to confront the crisis and that 
the entrance of dollars confi rms that the country is in a favorable position to 
benefi t with the crisis in the central countries. 
 Once again, it is diffi cult to identify the weight of each of the basic 
factors that can explain the surprising performance of the entrance of foreign 
capital. In addition to the positive expectations about the future of the 
Brazilian economy, there is large surplus liquidity in the world, the fruit of 
the aggressive market rescue policies enacted by the United States and other 
countries of the center. This capital looking for investments may be forming 
a new speculative wave, now focused on securities in “emerging” countries. 
There is also the attraction of high real interest rates that Brazil continues to 
offer: despite the nominal cut in interest rates since late 2008, real interest rates 
in Brazil continue very high in relation to other countries in the world.  In 
addition, and as occurred in 2004 - 2007, the expectation that the real will 
increase in value makes investment in Brazilian interest rates even 
more attractive. 
 The high interest rates were an important part of the Brazilian 
liberalization model, and not only because they attracted foreign capital that 
helped to develop a favorable exchange position, with the high accumulation of 
foreign reserves. The high interest rates sustain a process of transfer of resources 
from the Treasury to the banks, large companies and government creditors, a 
process at the foundation of the oft-mentioned solidity of the Brazilian banking 
system. The banks in these years had strong earnings from the interest on 
government bonds, paid by the Treasury, and expanded credit in a secure and 
selective manner. 
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 The high weight of interest, around 6% of GNP, can only be sustained 
by the government accounts because of the progressive increase in tax revenues, 
which began under the Real Plan. The ability to increase tax revenues without 
political confl ict gave the government room to maneuver to accommodate 
increased current spending and the costs of policies essential to the success of 
the program, notably the increased value of the real and high interest, utilized 
intensely as anti-infl ationary instruments and for equilibirum in foreign accounts.  
The continued increase in revenue also allowed avoiding the risk of an explosive 
trajectory for the public debt, particularly in 1998 and 1999 when the public 
sector assumed the costs of defending the currency regime and its later rupture, 
with the devaluation in January 1999. A similar process occurred in later 
years, with the absorption of the costs of rescuing the banking system and the 
consolidation of liabilities inherited from the past.3
 In addition, the substantial increase in tax revenue through successive 
topical and emergency measures gave the government room to maneuver to avoid 
the grave confl icts of interest that could threaten parliamentary support for the 
economic policy, in case it had insisted in drastic spending cuts or in a broad 
reform of the tax structure. The counterpart of this fl exibility and trajectory 
of accommodation was the permanence of elements harmful to the effi ciency 
and competitiveness of the economy, both in the tax structure, as well as in the 
composition of public spending.
 This same tax base now proved to be decisive in light of the crisis. The 
government has room to promote localized tax cuts and to alleviate the weight 
of the fi scal surplus, even playing with the fi scal gains provided by the cut in 
interest rates that weighed on the government debt. That debt, in turn, although 
it grew continuously internally, had a signifi cant drop as a whole, because of the 
accumulation of foreign reserves in recent years, enough to nearly eliminate the 
public sector’s net foreign debt. 
 The government’s fi scal performance is one of the characteristics that can 
be called Brazilian-style liberalism. Despite all the discourse around the reduced 
role of the State and of accusations that neoliberalism had weakened the public 
sector, the Brazilian state has displayed strong power to react to the crisis and 
the government has powerful instruments from the past that were maintained 
by the Fernando Henrique Government, like the federal public banks and the 
public funds.
References from the Past and Attempts to See Ahead
 The Brazilian economy has confronted considerable diffi culties from 
the strongly adverse external situations, such as the Depression of the 1930s 
and the debt crises of the 1980s. The violent external shocks and the domestic 
consequences caused far reaching changes.  These two cases led to changes in the 
economic development model with no return to the past. The rhythm of recovery, 
however, was much faster and much more intense in the fi rst case, although the 
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foreign crisis was much more severe. The  distinct behaviors stem from known 
factors, particularly the ability to react and structure of the central countries and 
the articulation of domestic economic and political forces capable of controlling 
and sustaining the changes in orientation imposed by the crisis. But the behavior 
also refl ects attempts to exploit alternatives created by the unprecedented situation 
generated by the crisis. 
 The current crisis creates new opportunities and the ability to take 
advantage of this potential will depend on the correct identifi cation of the 
determinants of reaction that the Brazilian economy has presented and other 
factors. It appears clear that until now the external insertion realized in recent 
years offers reasonable protection against the drop in demand of the central 
countries, as long as China maintains its dynamism. It is also evident that the 
Brazilian State has the ability to react to the crisis, with the fi scal and monetary 
arrangement that capitalized the banking system and allowed the Treasury greater 
margin of maneuver  in applying anti-cyclic measures. It remains to be seen if 
this situation is capable of generating growth that is accompanied by technical 
progress and social inclusion.
Notes
1  Refl ections presented by Henry Singer Gonzalez, of Fram Capital, in a seminar at PUC-
SP, in April 2009.
2  In Rodrigues (2008), there is a sketch of the arguments involved in this polemic and an 
excellent empiric study of the changes in Brazil’s trade structure since liberalization.
3  There is broad literature about the fi scal issues in the Real Plan. See, for example, 
Carvalho (2000).
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ABSTRACT – Reviewing the fi rst months of 2009, it is surprising to see the Brazilian 
economy’s resistance to the international crisis. The declines in production and investment 
were intense, however, there has been neither a foreign exchange crisis nor fi scal and fi nancial 
system disturbances. The government was able to apply anti-cyclic policies, such as tax 
cuts and interest rate reductions, assisted by the currently high tax revenues and strength 
in the banking sector, after years of high interest rates, and the ability to use public banks 
and public funds, valuable instruments inherited from the past. Regarding external factors, 
the capital infl ow is stimulated by the higher liquidity generated by the recent U.S. policy 
for monetary expansion, while exports are due to the maintenance of Chinese demand, 
with a signifi cant increase in the role of basic commodities and a decrease in manufactured 
products. The ability to react to the crises is a great test for the Brazilian model of economic 
opening, in the same way that the diffi culties in sustaining the export of industrialized goods 
and recovering investment rates in manufacturing activities are considerable challenges.
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